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The article develops the insights of historical institutionalism and cognate work within 
International Relations to examine the development of security institutions within states, 
dealing specifically with the development of the National Security Council (NSC) in the 
United States. The case focuses on the creation and reproduction of the NSC as a means to 
fostering civil-military coordination within the US state. The article argues that exogenous 
shocks are crucial in providing the necessary freedom to change existing institutions, which 
are then set on new contingent paths. Substantively it is argued that World War II and the 
experiences derived from it provided a critical juncture for the creation of new security 
institutions such as the NSC, and once created the NSC was characterized by forms of path 
dependence that have reproduced the institution over time. The article demonstrates how 
historical institutionalism can clarify causal mechanisms that better explain the origins and 
durability of internationally-oriented security institutions within states. 
 
On July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act, ending years of debate 
about the unification of the US armed forces. The Act inaugurated not only an unheralded 
change in the bureaucracy of the federal government, but also formally institutionalized a 
new set of relationships regarding civil-military coordination, mainly seen in the creation of 
the National Security Council (NSC), and (in 1949) the Department of Defense, that are key 
parts of what can be called the “national security state” (Yergin 1977; Hogan 1998; Stuart 
2008a). On the face of it, explaining such a change should be straightforward in terms of 
conventional approaches in International Relations (IR) and its subfield of Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA): such a change was necessary to better provide for the national security, and 
represented at best a rational (instrumental) solution to a present problem, or at worst a 
political compromise to deal with a clash of interested parties. However, such explanations 
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seem to leave much out of the story. Why 1947? After years of failed attempts to do anything 
about coordination, why was the postwar moment so ripe for change? How was traditional 
anti-statism in the US overcome? Additionally, what are the enduring consequences of such 
institutions? Such questions are not just interesting in terms of the case at hand, but also for 
trying to identify the kinds of causal mechanisms that allow institutional change and 
reproduction in the postwar case.  
The analysis of institutions in IR has had a long pedigree, from the study of formal 
international organizations to the more recent work on international regimes (Krasner 1981; 
Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). Much of the work on such institutions has been in the form of 
either rational choice institutionalism – a focus on institutions as instrumental results of 
agential preference – or in the form of more constructivist-oriented work that sees institutions 
as shared set of identities (or rules) that govern social relations (Fearon and Wendt 2001; c.f. 
Wendt 2001). These two approaches tend to focus on very different aspects of institutions: 
choice theoretic approaches focusing on the results of processes of institutionalization, 
constructivists on the development of ideas fostering such institutions (Glenn 2003). As such 
both tend to be more interested in the outputs of institutions rather than their origins or 
development in time. Work by those using historical institutionalist forms of analysis has 
been much less prevalent in IR, though effectively utilized by a number of scholars in a 
variety of contexts (e.g. Krasner 1984; Spruyt 1994; Ikenberry 2001; Nexon 2009). All of 
these authors have recognized both the historical contingency and path dependency of the 
development of institutions, in ways that are often overlooked by the two dominant forms of 
analysis. 
The recognition of a historical institutionalist alternative serves a different function in the 
present article. While many institutionally-minded IR scholars look at international 
institutions, the development of institutions that mediate foreign policy within the state have 
been much less commented upon using such theoretical approaches. Though a rich literature 
has developed analyzing foreign policy-making in terms of the psychology of decision-
making, and through the development of organizational cultures that impact on decision-
making, much of this literature is limited in its engagement with historical institutionalism as 
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a mode of analysis.1 The main problem with the FPA literature on these grounds is that it, 
like the institutional analyses mentioned above, is more interested in foreign policy outputs 
than institutional design or historical development. The historical institutionalist approach 
could have much to say in terms of two factors: the importance of critical junctures in 
creating initial institutional pathways; and how positive feedback creates causal mechanisms 
that inhibit change in institutions over time. Some of the latter claims are implicit in the 
literature, but they make little sense without a proper discussion of critical junctures (Pierson 
2004). 
Zegart (1999) has put forward one prominent attempt to explain the creation and 
evolution of security institutions within the US through a “new institutionalist” 
understanding. While her account moves the debate substantially forward, it does not go far 
enough in addressing some of the issues brought up by the historical institutionalist project.2 
In the following, a complementary account to Zegart’s analysis is provided by examining the 
development of the National Security Council (NSC) through a broadly historical 
institutionalist analysis. The article first focuses on how institutional change can be analyzed 
in the context of security institutions, to better understand the origins and pathways of 
institutions in foreign policy making. A cue is taken from Pierson’s (2004) work on path 
dependency and positive feedback in order to develop a historical method for analyzing 
institutional design and development. The analytic framework for examining path dependent 
institutions and processes is then utilized to examine the development of the NSC in more 
detail, in order to explain what has become a familiar story in a different manner.  
The article puts forward two core claims concerning the development of the NSC after 
World War II. First, the importance of timing in institutional development is examined: the 
NSC (as part of the National Security Act) could only have been created when it was due to a 
variety of contingencies. The explanation of why reforms were made at this particular time is 
best explained by a critical juncture of a number of events – the endogenous desire for reform 
plus the (exogenous) insecurity created by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the 
                                                
1 For example, see the overviews in Carlsnaes (2002) and Hudson (2005). 
2 Granted that Zegart may not have been interested in some of these questions: her account is mainly geared 
at explaining why security agencies are not rationally (or functionally) designed. 
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experience of World War II (reinforced by an increasing Soviet threat). This claim draws on 
Zegart’s focus on the sub-rationality in the development of institutions, but puts history and 
timing back into the account. Second, the mechanisms of evolution and the reproduction of 
the NSC are accounted for. The second claim concerns the durability of institutions. Once the 
NSC was institutionalized, positive feedback mechanisms enabled its longevity, especially 
through the combination of increased presidential power over foreign policy and the 
increased actual use of the NSC as a coordinating body. This claim points to the importance 
of specific casual mechanisms and social relations reproducing security institutions over time.  
Overall, the article uses the creation of the NSC as a means to seeking better explanations 
of important socio-political phenomena through the utilization of a more historically-nuanced 
approach to explaining institutions. The substantive claims about the creation and 
reproduction of the NSC will be placed in the context of the usefulness of historical 
institutionalism for understanding international relations. 
Explaining Institutional Change in Foreign Policy and Security Institutions 
The development of the NSC after World War II has been surprisingly under-studied within 
the field of IR. While a number of historians have looked at the development of the NSC in 
the context of the National Security Act and state-building postwar, it has received relatively 
little attention in IR or FPA.3 Zegart’s (1999) account of the development of the NSC, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and CIA is one of the few sustained analyses in the IR literature that amounts 
to an actual theory of institutional creation of national security institutions (or “agencies” as 
she refers to them). Indeed her work provides a sophisticated economic “new 
                                                
3 Within IR three books stand out: Zegart (1999); Friedberg (2000); and Stuart (2008a), which has more 
recently analysed the 1947 Act in the context of the aftermath of World War II (Stuart’s account overlaps 
somewhat with my own, though it does not explicitly draw on historical institutionalism as an approach). 
Rothkopf (2005) and Prados (1991) give historical overviews that are not focused on explaining institutions. 
Daalder and Destler (2009) focus on individuals (primarily from 1960 onwards), and give a rich account of the 
policy process and the interactions between presidents and particular national security advisors. Older 
evaluations can be found in May (1955), Hammond (1977), Neu (1987) and Falk (2004). Additionally, there 
have been a number of works on the postwar era in American political development that focus more broadly on 
the “national security state”, which have drawn on historical institutionalism, implicitly or explicitly: e.g. Sherry 
(1995); Hogan (1998); Grossman (2001); and Waddell (2001).  
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institutionalist”4 analysis of the development of foreign policy institutions, and has the virtue, 
as explicitly stated in her study, of taking such agencies seriously as objects of analysis in 
their own right. As she points out, such organizations tend to be “too domestic” for most IR 
scholars, and “too international” for specialists in American politics (Zegart 1999: 3).  
Zegart’s main argument is that the form of those institutions of national security was 
greatly impacted upon by institutional bargaining: i.e. the form was not rational or efficient. 
Drawing on the new institutionalism in political science, Zegart sets up a modified account of 
the creation of governmental agencies, which points to the clash of interests that go into the 
process of agency creation. In the “domestic” account, Congress leads agency design, with 
the actual design being suboptimal due to bargaining between Congress (Congressional 
champions) and interest groups. The evolution of such agencies is explained mainly through 
Congress: its initiatives, oversight and legislation, and finally through the changing 
environment of Congressional committees, interest groups, etc. In Zegart’s modified account, 
the Executive branch drives agency design, and the conflict of interest comes from competing 
bureaucratic interests within the Executive branch. The Executive branch also drives 
evolution, due to low Congressional oversight, and other sources of change tend to include 
initial agency structure, interests, and environment (Zegart 1999). 
Zegart’s account certainly hits its intended target: rational actor accounts of international 
relations, as well as the limits of FPA. In terms of the former, she is keen to point out the 
importance of sub-optimally designed agencies, as the logic of rationalist approaches to IR 
sees the structure of government as being able to pursue whatever foreign policy is most 
rational (i.e. policies which promote the continued well-being of the state), and as such, 
internal agencies should be designed with this in mind. That agencies are political products 
created non-functionally and may lead to poorly formulated and implemented foreign policy 
is a real knock to the elegant rationalist theory of international relations. Zegart is also 
targeting FPA scholars who take little interest in such agencies as dependent variables: as she 
argues FPA scholars are primarily interested in the outputs of such agencies, and do not see 
                                                
4 There is a key distinction between the economic and sociological versions of the “new institutionalism”. 
For a sustained discussion, see Taylor and Hall (1997) and Immergut (1998); for some representative examples, 
see March and Olsen (1984) and Moe (1984). 
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them as important objects of analysis in their own right.5 As an overall critique of the rational 
actor assumption, and of opening up a neglected area of discussion within FPA, Zegart is 
successful.  
While Zegart’s analysis is convincing in regards to the politics of agency creation (and in 
much of the account of the problems that initial developments create for the future), it seems 
less well-suited for accounting for why the change happened at that particular time. In fact, 
her new institutionalist theory of foreign policy actors within states deliberately discounts 
exogenous events (be they changes in international relations or other environmental factors) 
in the process of institutional creation, in favor of a focus on domestic politics, and 
particularly the clash of interests inherent in institutional creation. This serves an important 
purpose for her theory: to show that domestic politics is more important than international 
politics in the institutional creation of domestic security institutions. International events may 
set the context, but actual agency design is done through domestic bargaining: “international 
factors may have prompted the unification issue to arise, but only domestic political 
wrangling explains how it was settled” (Zegart 1999: 106). While ignoring international 
events in terms of the eventual creation of institutions seems fine inasmuch as it goes away 
from a rational/efficiency account of institutional development, it ignores the actual causal 
chains leading to institutional creation.  
This can be seen in two distinct ways. First, it avoids the importance of particular critical 
junctures of events allowing for the possibility of institutional creation. The extent to which 
such critical junctures lead to institutions impacts on both the form they can take as well as 
having substantial downstream effects. Tilly (1995) has noted that regularities in political life 
do exist, but are highly contingent on their timing. That is not to say that there are not 
recurrences, just that, as Tilly (1995: 1601) notes, “recurrent causes which in different 
circumstances and sequences compound into highly variable but nonetheless explicable 
                                                
5 Compare the classic work of Allison and Zelikow (1999) with the overviews of Carlsnaes (2002), Hill 
(2003) and Hudson (2005). See also the forum on the state of FPA in the journal International Studies Review 
(Garrison 2003).  
 7 
effects”.6 For example, Zegart’s account purports to establish a theory of security agency 
development, focusing on the role of Executive branch versus Congress, interest group 
behavior, and the insularity of such agencies. However, much of the impetus for institutional 
creation in these cases is highly contingent on historical circumstances, and any theory of the 
development of such agencies needs to take these contingent circumstances – their historical 
causes – into account if they are to be understood. In the case at hand, previous attempts to 
unify the armed forces were not able to succeed due to timing: as such the postwar (and post-
Pearl Harbor) environment is crucial to institutional creation, and for explaining the origins of 
the NSC.  
Second, critical junctures also delimit the potential options for institutional creation: it is 
not just the embedded interests of the players involved in institutional creation that leads to 
sub-rationality, but the timing of creation. Again, the development of greater civil-military 
cooperation and centralization was not just due to interagency bargaining, but due to the 
experiences of World War II. Overall, it is a mistake to treat international politics as a source 
of institutions in the sense that international events impel actors to create institutions in order 
to rationally deal with some threat, rather than as creating a critical juncture for the possibility 
of institutional creation. That in this particular instance such events are exogenous to the 
political system may be unique, but perhaps not so unique for the creation of internationally-
oriented domestic agencies. 
These issues all pose problems for the new institutionalism. Showing the political conflict 
in decision-making has the virtue of moving the analysis away from functionalism, as well as 
the addition of a focus on agency creation, but is less clear on a number of other issues, 
including the historical causation of the particular case, and also about the particular 
mechanisms of institutional evolution and reproduction. And here the difference becomes 
clear between the purpose and methods of a choice-theoretic institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism. As Thelen (1999: 382) argues, “whereas rational choice theorists tend to 
view institutions in terms of their coordinating functions, historical institutionalists see 
                                                
6 This chimes with Abbott’s (2001: 256) description of “peculiarly essential junctures as being like 
arrangements of tumblers in a lock: if an action sits just right under the tumblers, it becomes the key that opens, 
the agent of sudden advantage or disadvantage”. 
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institutions as the legacy of concrete historical processes”. Though many of the distinctions 
between these two approaches to institutions are becoming blurred, the focus on historical 
causation and path dependent processes (as well as institutional evolution) is a real hallmark 
of the historical institutional approach.7 These two types of causal analysis become of 
paramount importance: and in analyzing the creation and reproduction of security institutions 
in the US post-World War II, historical causation is rather underspecified in Zegart’s model, 
stressing as it does the politics of institutional creation rather than the specific historical 
conditions that give rise to the possibility of institutional creation.  
For historical institutionalists, the influence of particular historical junctures for 
institutional creation is of crucial importance to institutional creation (Mahoney 2000; 
Pierson 2004; c.f. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; and Capoccia and Kelemen 2007).8 
Critical junctures, “moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby 
creating a ‘branching point’ from which historical development moves onto a new path” 
(Hall and Taylor 1996: 942), need to be specified in order to see how monumental change 
can happen in the first place, as these junctures are as crucial to institutional creation as the 
specific bargaining between actors that provides the act of creation. The reasons for this are 
twofold. First, critical junctures tend to provide exogenous pressures on political orders that 
need to be dealt with for political orders to continue (Lieberman 2002; c.f. Hay 1999). 
Second, institutional creation, development and reproduction are so highly contingent on 
such junctures that the causal pathways for creation need to be properly mapped out in order 
to understand why particular institutions are created, how they are reproduced, and how they 
can evolve. 
Having given a brief overview of the importance of historical institutional analysis in 
terms of explaining critical junctures, it remains to utilize the concept in examining the 
development of the NSC in the US post-World War II. While much of the criticism above 
                                                
7 Thelen (1999) goes through a number of the blurred areas (while maintaining that some distinctions – 
such as theoretical versus empirical work; endogenous versus exogenous preferences; micro versus macro 
research; functional versus historical institutions – still remain important), while Pierson (2004) provides a 
synthesis of sorts between the two positions.  
8 There are important similarities between the historical institutional literatures and social theoretic 
approaches that attempt to put time back in social analysis in a meaningful manner; e.g. Abbott (2001) and 
Sewell (2005). 
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was focused on rational choice institutionalism, this is not because it is seen as wrong; rather 
it is partial in its explanations. Zegart’s work was highlighted due to its focus on the 
institutions in question, and particularly in exemplifying the strengths and weaknesses of the 
new institutionalism.  
A Critical Juncture: World War II and the Creation of the National Security Council 
The historical institutionalist approach stresses the role of critical junctures in leading to 
institutional change (Hall and Taylor 1996; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004). Focusing on such 
junctures can better explain why events can cause certain impacts only at particular times, 
when a variety of variables line up in productive manner. The legacy of such junctures is 
important in a number of ways, but mainly due to the contingency of outcomes, and to the 
downstream effects of such moments. Overall, the development of robust security institutions 
within the US after World War II, through unification of the armed forces, greater civil-
military integration, and the creation of intelligence agencies need to be seen as part of a 
broader context of historical explanation. To borrow a phrase from Pierson (2000; c.f. 2004), 
it is “not just what, but when” that is important in institutional creation.  
The move towards the National Security Act and unification was a compromise of sorts 
between the key bureaucratic players (the Departments of War and Navy) and the president.9 
The Department of the Navy had long been opposed to unification, as it was seen as a threat 
to the autonomy of the Navy in terms of its organization, its direct access to the president, 
and budget appropriations; and also through its fear of decline relative to the Army and Air 
Force. The Army, however, with much to gain, was pushing for much more centralization: a 
permanent Secretary of Defense, with control of access to the president, and control over 
budgets. Because of the Army’s wartime experiences, it seemed centralization was the best 
way to promote the Army against the other services; centralization was also seen as more 
efficient, as part of Army traditions. The pushing and pulling that resulted in the full NSC 
system and the creation of the National Military Establishment ended up being a compromise 
                                                
9 The account of the next few paragraphs is drawn from: Caraley (1966); Hammond (1977); Nelson (1981); 
Hogan (1998); and Zegart (1999). 
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of both of these things: the NSC became an advisory body that lacked authoritative power, 
and the Secretary of Defense had less power than was hoped for (Truman 1956: chap. 3).  
In the instance of the NSC, a plausible question can be asked about why it was created 
when it was, and more specifically why was its “Magna Charta” (as Hogan (1998) describes 
it), the National Security Act of 1947, was passed when it was. Though this may sound a 
rather banal question, it seems important in looking back to the sequence of events that led to 
the passing of the Act, and why the issues that it dealt with were of such importance. If the 
outcomes of the Act were rather sub-optimal, as Zegart has argued, then we still might ask 
the question of why the institutions were even possible to create at the time.  
An important starting point can be seen focusing specifically on the dual issues of the 
civilian coordination of the armed services and greater political-military consultation; we can 
legitimately ask why such reform had not been successful earlier, and what specifically about 
the postwar moment made reform a possibility (or even a necessity). Unification had been an 
issue from the late-nineteenth century onward, often, unsurprisingly, as the consequence of 
major wars.10 Borklund (1966) notes a number of early proposals for unification of Army and 
War with a variety of relationships, and also the narrow defeat in the House in 1932 of a full-
blown institution similar to the Department of Defense (though proposed entirely as a cost-
cutting measure). Although it was the unification of the armed forces was where the main 
battlelines of the post-World War II debate were drawn, the creation of the NSC was an 
important part of the proposals, if often forgotten about in the heated battles between the 
Army and Navy and the president in the debates surrounding unification.11  
The problem of coordinating a long-term strategy for foreign policy had been realized by 
a few, as May (1995) points out,12 at the beginning of the twentieth century. Many of these 
commentators recognized the poor planning and coordination between the Navy and War 
                                                
10 There is a broad literature demonstrating the relationship between war and political change, especially in 
terms of the expansion of state capacity after wars: e.g. Skowronek (1982), Bensel (1990), Porter (1994), Sherry 
(1997), Hogan (1998) and Mayhew (2005). 
11 Details can be found in Caraley (1966); Hammond (1977); Hogan (1998: esp. chap. 2); Zegart (1999); 
and Stuart (2008a: esp. chaps. 3 and 4). Forrestal had made the NSC an integral part of Navy’s position, as seen 
in the Eberstadt report, even if it was subordinate to the greater issue of Navy autonomy (Caraley, 1966; Hogan, 
1998).  
12 The following paragraph draws heavily on May (1955). 
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departments, and the Department of State. Across the late-nineteenth to early-twentieth 
century, consultation between State, War and Navy was done through personal 
communication between the three Secretaries. Though obviously a form of consultation, it 
never worked effectively, and military and political decisions often reached the White House 
separately, and the president ended up having to weigh the differences between political and 
military objectives, in order to form some sort of coherence. Though experiences in World 
War I and reforms to all three executive departments increased some desire for consultation, 
much proposed went nowhere.13 May’s account (though possibly a bit too deterministic in 
charting the legacy) shows the evolution towards an increased political-military consultation, 
which should be seen as a form of civil-military relations, had been around for some time, but 
never made possible (c.f. Stuart 2008a: esp. chap. 1).  
Talk of clearer military-political collaboration long preceded World War II, as May 
(1955) has ably demonstrated, so why was institutional creation not possible in the interwar 
period? In many ways the answer is obvious, as the problems with inter-service 
communication were seen as leading to the Pearl Harbor attack, and the realties of total war 
required a more unified approach to national defence. However, as the institutions that were 
created out of the Act were not as efficiently designed as hindsight (or functionalism) might 
perceive, it is of necessity to better specify why 1947? The obvious answer to why they had 
never been achieved was due to the lack of overall urgency: as the system of foreign policy 
coordination that existed at the time had not led to any disasters, or been impacted upon 
substantially by external events, there was no need for change. As May (1955: 162) points 
out, “long years of isolated safety smothered the idea of political-military collaboration”. So, 
the main intervening causal factor, unsurprisingly, was the exogenous event of global war.  
However, an easy retrospective narrative should not belie the difficulty in seeing how the 
“lessons” of war could have led to a number of different institutional outcomes: a more 
centralized and militarized state, a more New Deal-style domestic focus, an international 
strategy based on diplomacy and economics, or an isolationist foreign policy (with an anti-
                                                
13 May (1955) notes that a 1919 letter sent by then Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt outlining a 
joint organization for war planning, containing representatives from all three departments, had not been 
acknowledged, delivered to the wrong address, and for all intents and purposes, unopened. 
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statist impulse) (May 1992: 219). However, the critical conjuncture of events, ideas and 
friction of previous institutions combined in this particular critical juncture to lead to a 
stronger state, but one that was more based on civilian coordination than military leadership. 
In addition to the already mentioned issue concerning overcoming inter-service rivalries and 
communications concerns in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor,14 four factors here seem 
especially important. 
First, the attack at Pearl Harbor and the nature of total war led to an increased sense of 
insecurity, leading to a need for permanent preparedness. As John Lewis Gaddis (1987: 21-
22) notes, “this [new] sense of vulnerability is basic to an understanding of how Americans 
perceived their interests—and potential threats to them—in the postwar world”. Prior to the 
sense of vulnerability created by the Pearl Harbor attack, the US had sought security through 
the protection of the Americas from external influences, a legacy of the “isolationism” of 
earlier leaders, but also borne of experiences from the interwar period: the inward looking 
nature of economic development and of economic recovery (Gaddis 1987: 22). Stuart goes as 
far as referring to the institutions created by the National Security Act as the “Pearl Harbor 
system” (Stuart 2008a), pointing to Pearl Harbor as the key “trigger event” (Stuart 2008b) 
that allowed for a redefinition of American national security (c.f. Gaddis 2004: chap. 3). 
Furthermore, the signing of the National Security Act did not only draw on a new 
understanding of America’s role in the world drawn from the experiences of World War II. 
The debates about unification were also made in a context where suspicion of the Soviet 
Union became more and more pronounced. The passage of the National Security Act also has 
to be seen in the context of anti-communism, that also appeared in a series of important 
statements on the nature of the Soviet Union, especially seen in George Kennan’s Long 
Telegram and “X” article, and in Truman’s articulation of the Truman Doctrine (Kennan 
1947; Truman 1947; Gaddis 1987; Heale 1990; Hogan 1998). If the new security 
arrangements were derived from the experience of Pearl Harbor, the materialization of the 
Soviet Union as a threat kept the memory alive, and the necessity for preparedness (Gaddis 
1987). All in all, the changes combined to make a favorable environment for the national 
                                                
14 For more on this aspect, see Wohlstetter (1962) and Prange (1991). 
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security state, with all of the potential danger of militarization that its critics had warned of 
(Lasswell 1941). As Yergin (1977: 201) elaborates, “the doctrine of national security did not 
emerge apart from Soviet-American relations. It also helped to provide a framework for 
evaluating the problems of international politics and Soviet behaviour”.  
Second, a related lesson was found in the changed nature of war. In total war, the lines 
between peacetime and wartime were seen as completely blurred, which necessitated a 
permanent preparedness (Shaw 1988). America would be permanently vulnerable, because, 
as General Henry H. Arnold reported, nuclear weapons could, “without warning, pass over all 
formerly visualized barriers or ‘lines of defense’ and . . . deliver devastating blows at our 
population centers and our industrial, economic or governmental heart” (Leffler 1984; Gaddis 
1987: 24; cf. Stuart 2008a: chap. 1). The blurring of war and peace led to an increased 
perception that the state would take an increased role in organizing for security: this, as 
Sherry (1997: 138) notes, “embodied the conviction that in an age of instant and total 
warfare, the vigilant nation must be constantly prepared by harnessing all its resources and 
linking its civilian and military institutions—indeed, obliterating the boundary between those 
institutions, just as the line between war and peace was disappearing”. 
Third, the existence of a new vision for security, which Hogan describes as the “national 
security ideology”, was crucial in challenging an older discourse of the role of the state in 
American life. There was a clash between the new globalist national security ideology and 
older political traditions. One side was composed of a conservative anti-statism, which was in 
security terms against “entangling alliances, a large peacetime military establishment, and the 
centralization of authority in national government” (Hogan 1998: 8). There was an especially 
strong concern about increased militarism: Senator Edward Robertson, who strongly opposed 
unification, argued that “the bill fostered ‘militarism’ and set up in the Joint Staff the ‘germ’ 
from which the ‘great National General staff is expected to emerge in time’ ” (Caraley 1966: 
169). Such a position was well-represented by the traditional anti-statism of Senator Robert 
Taft (Matthews 1982). The other side was made up of those agreeing with a special narrative 
of the US, but one that was tempered towards the needs of security in a new international 
environment. The debate on the bill in Congress often hinged on these arguments for the 
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broader notion of security. As Hogan (1998: 60) points out, “‘Remember Pearl Harbor!’ was 
a favorite refrain, because that disaster had underscored the need for better intelligence, for 
teamwork between the services, and for permanent preparedness”. In the Senate, reference to 
Pearl Harbor was also a standard pro-unification argument, one made prominently by Senator 
Chan Gurney, who was in charge of the bill (Caraley 1966: 168).  
Finally, the overall success of the civilian-led coordination of the war, in political-
economic terms, certainly meant an easing into a permanent coordinating role for the state 
(and indeed the national security state) was not entirely unprecedented (Sherry 1987; c.f. 
Friedberg 2000; Koistinen 2004; Stuart 2008a: chap. 2). In fact, the role of business elites in 
the war-time coordination bodies, such as the War Production Board, had a lasting effect on 
American government, as many of those involved went on to become major players in the 
national security state. As Grossman (2002) has pointed out, it is certainly problematic to 
point to a cabal of “bullets and bankers” as much early revisionist Cold War historiography 
did, but the situation postwar can by no means be detached from the wartime political 
economy, and indeed the New Deal itself (Brinkley 1996; Waddell 2001).  
The causal chains leading from World War II to the passing of the National Security Act 
and creation of the NSC are more complicated than a straightforward reading suggests. 
Overall, the explanation of why reforms were made at this particular time is best explained 
by a critical juncture of a number of events – the endogenous desire for reform plus the 
(exogenous) insecurity created by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (reinforced by the 
potential Soviet threat) and the variety of experiences from World War II. The very 
contingency of the reform initiated speaks volumes about why timing is important. Reform 
would have been extremely difficult without an external contingency to unsettle previous 
arrangements. In just looking at political-military coordination in this context, we can see that 
without some prior desire for this kind of reform, or for the traditions of coordination in the 
political economy of the US, this kind of coordinating body may have been discarded in favor 
of something more authoritative in policy terms, or even for something more centralizing and 
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militarist.15 As Lieberman (2002: 709) notes, “so when does an idea’s time come? The 
answer lies in the match between idea and moment. An idea’s time arrives not simply 
because the idea is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political 
circumstances favor it”. All in all, civil-military reform had indeed become an idea whose 
time had come. 
Institutions in Time: Path Dependence, Reproduction and Evolution 
Understanding the contingency of institutional creation also leads to a better understanding of 
the downstream effects of such moments as well. The importance of a critical juncture in the 
creation of the NSC (and the National Security Act) is not just that it provided an opportunity 
for interested parties to pursue their preferences, but also that that particular moment gave 
rise to specific options that were otherwise completely off the table. The importance of 
“historical causes” therefore goes beyond just creating a moment for actors to bargain, but 
allows for “some historical event or process generate a particular outcome, which is then 
reproduced through time even though the original generating event or process does not 
recur” (Pierson 2004: 45). That is to say that the very “stickiness” of institutions is predicated 
on the critical juncture, not just the particulars of bargaining. As Pierson (2004: 51) further 
states, “what makes a critical juncture ‘critical’ is that it triggers a process of positive 
feedback”.  
The goal of institutional analysis is often to understand why particular political orders are 
robust, and difficult to overcome. Choice theoretic approaches to institutions tend to be more 
interested in the products of institutions, rather than the mechanisms by which they reproduce 
themselves. As such, the initial choices and unintended consequences of institutional design 
are often ignored in favor of examining the outcomes. If one real virtue of Zegart’s analysis is 
to move away from such functionalism in order to show how the preferences of actors can 
lead to sub-optimal institutions, a second is to show that the initial design really matters for 
the future. She shows in detail, in the example of the NSC, that after the institution had been 
                                                
15 Another important contingency involved the role of the NSC: the NSC, though argued for by Navy and, 
to some degree, by President Truman, its exact role and functioning became secondary to the shape of the 
National Military Establishment, and the role and formal power of the Secretary of Defense. That the NSC 
would be come a fundamental foreign policy-making body only evolved in time. 
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inaugurated, its contours remained constant until the present day. Unlike analysts who tended 
to show that the NSC was shaped more by presidents (and sometimes by national security 
advisors) (c.f. Daalder and Destler 2009; Rothkopf 2005), Zegart argues that main 
institutional function stayed constant in time, despite numerous attempts at reform, which is 
more explained through its creation.  
The “stickiness” of initial institutional designs needs to be explained in terms of the 
mechanisms causing institutional reproduction. The connection between critical junctures and 
path dependency is here crucial. Critical junctures of events can often lead to courses of 
action that are difficult to reverse. For path dependency, positive feedback is of central 
importance, in both showing that costs of changing course will increase over time, and that 
issues of timing and sequencing are very important (Pierson 2004: 19). As Pierson (2004: 26) 
states, “in the contexts of complex social interdependence, new institutions often entail high 
start-up costs, and they produce considerable learning effects, coordination effects and 
adaptive expectations. Established institutions will typically generate powerful inducements 
that reinforce their own stability and further development”. The robustness of institutions 
created at critical junctures often relies on positive feedback: that the costs of abandoning 
such institutions are high, and therefore impede attempts to redesign them.  
The path dependent nature of institutions therefore plays an important part in most 
analyses of institutional design and reproduction (Campbell 2004). Choices made at the 
outset of institutional design become hard to dislodge overtime because of positive feedback. 
However, the causal mechanisms of institutional reproduction are often underspecified, and, 
additionally, underplay the evolution of institutions over time, especially as they cause 
friction with other extant institutions. Without identifying mechanisms of reproduction, path 
dependency and positive feedback tends towards a description of stasis, rather than an 
explanation: what mechanisms lead to reproduction? Thelen (1999) notes two important 
mechanisms: incentive structure or coordination effects; and distributional effects. In the 
former, “actors adapt their strategies in ways that reflect but also reinforce the ‘logic’ of the 
system” (Thelen 1999: 392). For example, the NSC became a coordinating mechanism 
despite it being unwanted: but once in place, it was able to deal with coordination problems 
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inherent in the fractured nature of foreign policy-making – though the formal system was 
abandoned rather quickly. Distributional effects point to how institutions inaugurate 
particular forms of power relations, particularly reinforcing asymmetries in power that can 
block further change (Thelen 1999; Pierson 2004). In  the development of NSC, the manner 
in which it brought power over foreign policy making into the White House at the expense of 
other departments in the Executive branch (particularly State), not only reinforced 
presidential prerogatives in foreign policy, it went along with an overall increasing 
presidential power in the postwar period (Gould 2003).  
As such, the analysis of the reproduction of institutions is as important as the analysis of 
critical junctures: indeed they go hand in hand. However, a final issue in historical 
institutional analysis needs to be addressed: the consistent problem with all institutionalist 
theories has been the desire to explain stability at the price of change (Lieberman 2002; 
Pierson 2004). Though historical institutionalism has been slightly less susceptible, its focus 
on path dependence has tended to be more geared towards analyzing radical breaks and 
stasis, rather than the potential evolution of institutions (Thelen 1999). Pierson has 
highlighted this by pointing to the limitations in the critical junctures approach in analyzing 
institutional change: there is no sense of change downstream except for another critical 
juncture (Pierson 2004). As such historical institutionalism can have too much focus on 
stability and radical change, too little focus on change over time. 
Both Pierson and Thelen have tried to mitigate such problems by pointing to the 
importance of institutional evolution, to provide another way of looking at institutional 
development. The main theme of such an approach examines the multiple interactions of 
institutions, in that institutions always overlap and interact with other institutions.  
Mechanisms leading to evolutionary change in institutions tend to focus on processes such as 
layering, functional conversion, and diffusion (Pierson 2004: 137). Moving away from 
institutional creation and stasis (or stasis punctuated by radical change) points to a key insight 
of recent historical institutionalist work: the need to better integrate and understand processes 
of change and stability. As Pierson (2004: 166) states, “if institutional development is 
understood as an unfolding historical process, it is simply a mistake to juxtapose theories of 
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institutional stability and theories of institutional change. One cannot have one without the 
other”. 
The Evolution and Reproduction of the National Security Council  
Amongst a number of other agencies,16 the National Security Act of 1947 created a Cabinet 
level Secretary of Defense and the National Military Establishment; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
the National Security Council; and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is important to point 
out the continued change over time: the defence establishment continued to react and be 
shaped by external events, but merely as amendments to the Act. However, the importance of 
the new security bureaucracies was seen in their quick evolution. From the initial National 
Security Act, between 1949 and 1953, changes were made that impacted on the solidification 
of the bureaucracy: the creation of an executive-level Department of Defense; the abolition of 
the Cabinet positions of the Army, Navy and Air Force, along with their seats on the NSC 
(these first two changes being part of the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act), and 
the creation of the position of special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
(aka National Security Advisor). All in all, the quick institutional evolution and reproduction 
is a hugely important part of the analysis of these institutions. The NSC itself evolved quite 
quickly from its proposed formal role in the national security apparatus, and after which was 
rather stable in reproducing itself. How can we understand institutional reproduction and 
evolution in the case of the NSC? There are really two important processes that need to be 
better accounted for: the evolution of the NSC from an under-used formal coordination body 
into the centre of presidential-led national security; and the feedback mechanisms that made 
changes from the institutional path so hard to dislodge.  
In terms of evolutionary mechanisms, the clearest explanation is in terms of functional 
conversion, that the formal NSC gave way in a period of about ten years to the “informal” 
focus on the NSC staff, and the National Security Advisor as a key policy aide (or even 
policy advocate). As Pierson (2004: 138) argues, “because the meaning of formal rules must 
be interpreted, and multiple interpretations are often plausible, the substantive role of a set of 
                                                
16 Including three separate armed services – the Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force – the National 
Security Resources Board, the Munitions Board, the War Council, and the Research and Development Board. 
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rules may change even in the absence of formal revision”. What is important for the first 
stage of change is in terms of a redefinition of the purpose and function of the NSC, while 
still working within the formal written rules.  
The NSC is now at the heart of the transformation of security thinking, and is also the 
institution that not only put security policy-making squarely in the White House, but also 
served the purpose of effectively fusing civilian and military functions, as much as the 
creation of the Department of Defense. As James Forrestal described it, the NSC would 
provide for “the formal coordination between the formulators of foreign policy and the 
formulators of military policy [and] prevent us from coming from face to face with war for 
which we are unwarned or militarily unprepared” (cited in Caraley 1966: 161). Overall, the 
NSC system provided a major change in civil-military relations. The crucial change was to 
have civilian management of the security system: no more direct access to the president by 
the military departments, a civilian manager in charge of the military organization and 
budget, and civilian advisors leading security policy.  
However, the NSC itself only began to play this role by the 1960s as presidents realized 
its value in centering foreign policy within the White House. Although Truman and 
Eisenhower did not have the informal White House-centered foreign policy systems that 
characterized later administrations, they moved towards inflating informal roles such as that 
of staff secretaries and special advisors, while still promoting, to some extent, the formal 
NSC. However, in the early years, the NSC system was not used for much more than 
information, and was not used extensively by President Truman. This was partly to do with 
its novelty and lack of familiarity, but also to do with the way it was organized: it was more 
oriented towards giving policy papers on very specific international issues, a service led by 
the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) of the Department of State (Nelson 1981: 237-238).17 A 
major shift occurred at the end of the 1940s, mainly through the departure of George Kennan 
from the PPS, which allowed the NSC to have a mandate towards long-term strategic 
planning, which had been long-desired by the Defense establishment, and a mandate which 
                                                
17 Particular influence in the type of information provided was given by Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
and Policy Planning Staff director George Kennan. 
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Secretary Acheson also favored (Nelson 1981: 241). The move to long-term planning was 
emphasized in the creation of one of the founding documents of Cold War national security 
policy, NSC-68, which was delivered in April, 1950 (May 1993). 
Analyses of Eisenhower’s use of the NSC often focus on its formality: the council 
conducted regular meetings, in an attempt to re-establish the Council as the principal forum 
for establishing security policy, which Eisenhower saw as the original purpose behind its 
creation (Falk 2004: 41). The traditional focus on the formality of the Eisenhower system 
often misses the underlying informality which rather reflected things to come. Despite the 
presence of formality, especially in terms of respecting the inter-departmental cooperation 
that the NSC was supposed to foster, much foreign policy-making was done through the 
advice of trusted advisors, such as Secretary of State Dulles, and Eisenhower’s staff secretary 
Andrew J. Goodpaster (Destler 1986). In fact it has been noted that Goodpaster acted more 
like future national security advisors, and set a precedent for the Kennedy Administration 
(Destler 1981: 267; Zegart 1999: 82-83). 
The NSC system had become predominately under the president’s control by the time of 
the Kennedy Administration. If Eisenhower had done much to institutionalize the formal, 
statutory NSC system, Kennedy pushed it from being a mere advisory body to an important 
policy-creation institution, which was geared towards serving the president’s interests in 
foreign policy. This is exemplified in both the merging of the national security advisor and 
staff secretary into one role. Additionally, the NSC staff became much more presidential in 
its orientation. Originally conceived of as being non-partisan, to then being at least an inter-
Departmental working group, the staff, led by the national security advisor, became the 
president’s foreign policy team. The real move was away from the formal, statutory 
institution of the NSC towards its staff. As Zegart (1999: 76) argues, “by 1963, the 
organization . . . had become a shadow body, legitimating decisions that were debated and 
decided elsewhere”. Overall, the NSC system evolved into less of an inter-Departmental 
information source than as a policy implementer (Destler 1981). The key initial evolution was 
the functional conversion of the NSC from a formal institution mainly used to provide a 
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forum for key cabinet members of the foreign policy team to a more informal focus on the 
NSC staff that worked for the president.  
Such an evolution went hand in hand with the strengthening of the NSC-led coordinating 
role, through both a distributional mechanism, which saw an increase in presidential power in 
foreign policy through the use of the NSC, and a coordinating mechanism, which saw the 
actors involved with the NSC system play by its rules. The development of substantial 
political authority increased the asymmetry of relations in the development of security 
institutions, reflecting an overall increase of power in the White House. As Daalder and 
Destler (2009: 7) note, “since then, presidents have given less priority to making the overall 
government function with maximum effectiveness, and more to having a White House staff 
that is loyal to them alone”. Talk of an “imperial presidency” in the 1960s reflected this (e.g. 
Schlesinger 1973). In the security sphere, such imbalances are still felt today (e.g. Savage 
2007). The institutionalization of authority also leads to positive feedback.  
The change in the balance of power can be seen in the practice of NSC staff under 
Kennedy and Nixon, where National Security Advisors McGeorge Bundy and Henry 
Kissinger eclipsed the Secretaries of State,18 and the NSC staff became much more vocal 
about advocating specific policy positions, rather than being a non-partisan information 
source; in essence they became the president’s advisors instead of professional bureaucrats 
(Zegart 1999: 84). As Destler (1981: 268) points out, in the Kennedy administration, 
“particular members of the staff, like [Robert] Komer and Bundy’s deputy Carl Kaysen, did 
become identified with strong policy preferences that they worked to advance” (c.f. Daalder 
and Destler 2009: esp. chap. 2). The way in which Kissinger dominated foreign policy during 
the Nixon administration is well-known (e.g. Hanhimäki 2004), and from the outset, 
Kissinger sought to re-assert the centrality of the NSC by re-establishing the formality seen in 
the Eisenhower administration, but by also retaining the informality of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations.19 Overall, as Destler (1981: 271) states, “in the process of 
                                                
18 In Kissinger’s case, he filled both posts at once after 1973. 
19 “National Security Decision Memorandum 2”, distributed on January 20, 1969 to key foreign policy 
elites, outlines the renewed focus on the NSC quite clearly. See U.S. Department of State (2006: 30-33). 
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developing and dominating these procedures, Kissinger made many specific policy decisions 
himself”. 
President Reagan wanted to make the NSC less visible, and put it back to its intended 
role, after both the dominance of Kissinger and the very public divisions between Cyrus 
Vance and Zbignew Brzezinski during the Carter administration. However, there were 
already difficulties three weeks into his administration, found in a public dispute between his 
Secretary of State and White House aides. As Destler (1981: 264) points out, “that dispute 
raised serious questions about whether the president and his chief advisors could resist the 
broader forces that had brought the White House staff to foreign policy prominence and 
sometimes dominance”. Additionally, and most prominently, the Iran-Contra scandal again 
pointed to the problems of the quasi-autonomy of the NSC to implement national security 
policy (Daalder and Destler 2009: chap. 5; Rothkopf 2005: chap. 8). Iran-Contra not only 
pointed to the problems that could occur when the NSC was given too much autonomy, but 
also indicated how central to the policy process it had become. As Lou Cannon noted, 
“Reagan’s national security advisers wielded insufficient influence and excessive power” 
(cited in Daalder and Destler 2009: 154): while different management styles and personalities 
could impact how the system played out, there was no moving away from the White House-
dominated power dynamics.  
Overall, once the NSC had evolved into the more informal, staff-centered version, the 
mechanisms that reproduced it were further reinforced. Following the rules became crucial 
early on, as the NSC was at the centre of coordinating the increasingly massive security 
bureaucracy. Additionally, because of the rise in importance of the security bureaucracy, 
interests were reformulated in ways that coincided with the NSC-led security system: the 
NSC allowed for further power for the president over foreign policy that was never going to 
be easily given up. The informalization process led to an increase in presidential power over 
foreign policy that echoed the overall increase in presidential power over the course of the 
twentieth century (Gould 2003). The power asymmetries that the NSC gave the president 
were rather substantial, mainly to do with the rather insulated nature of the NSC: it was part 
of the Office of the President, had little to no Congressional oversight (e.g. the National 
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Security Advisor did not have to be confirmed by Congress), and had pretty much unlimited 
access to intelligence. The pre-World War II “security” policy-making was much more 
coordinated between various executive departments, where such departments were meant to 
have degrees of autonomy from the White House. As such, the NSC system as it existed by 
about the mid-1960s became the centre of foreign and defence policy making, and was 
almost impossible to dislodge, despite a number of scandals (e.g. Iran-Contra), perceived 
abuses of power, and reform proposals.20 After an initial evolutionary period, where the new 
institution of the NSC was bedded in, the increasing necessity of playing by its rules 
(coordination effects), and the increasing power asymmetries that it created (distributional 
effects) allowed for the reproduction of this core security institution over time.  
 
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis of the development of the NSC in the context of the 1947 National 
Security Act in the US demonstrates the benefits of a historical institutionalist analysis in IR. 
It is not necessarily meant to show that historical institutionalism provides the best theory, 
but to demonstrate its effectiveness in providing better explanations of the creation of and 
reproduction of institutions in time, the importance of causal mechanisms in accounts of 
causation, explanations that are generalizable but contingent on historical context and timing. 
Historical institutionalism is also valuable as an approach to history that moves beyond 
description and narration towards explicit causal explanation. 
The article also made some modest inroads towards a historical explanation of the 
development of security institutions in the US postwar, focusing on the NSC. What is crucial 
about the postwar moment in American political development is not just a focus on methods: 
it was a profound moment in American state-building, and the institutions of foreign and 
defence policy have had lasting impressions not only on US foreign policy, but of the 
organization and character of government overall. The downstream effects of initial choices 
have been quite large in terms of the size of the state, the proportion of government devoted 
                                                
20 Destler (1972) notes that numerous reports that were made between World War II and the writing of his 
1972 book had mainly been unsuccessful in implementing reform: 7 of the 11 reports had recommended for new 
mechanisms to place foreign policy squarely in State; two urged alternate solutions; the Jackson report explicitly 
warned against the concentration of FP decisions in a White House “super staff”. 
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to defence and security, and through institutional isomorphism (May 1992). The overarching 
historical thesis is that the postwar moment provides a key example of the interface between 
the “foreign” and “domestic”, confounding insular positions in both IR and political science. 
As such, the postwar moment should be seen as part of a broader debate about the 
interactions of war and society, and particularly of war and state-building (c.f. Grossman 
2002). 
Third, the analysis is meant to provide the basis for a comparative approach to examining 
the development and reproduction of security institutions within states. Such comparisons 
could be achieved in a number of fruitful ways. One would be in terms of examining the 
differential impacts of the post-World War II moment on ideas and institutionalization of 
“national security”. For example, examining the development of “national security” within 
the UK and Canada postwar would provide an interesting comparison to the US case: did the 
impact of war in these instances have similar long-term effects in developing national 
security institutions? A second approach would provide comparison within the US context, 
looking at other decisive moments of the transformation of security institutions within the 
US. A core example would be the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which fundamentally 
transformed the organization of the armed forces (Locher 2003): what events precipitated this 
transformation; how did it interact with existing institutions; and in what ways has the 
reformed system reproduced itself since? The point of historical institutionalism as a mode of 
analysis is that in these different historical and institutional contexts outcomes will likely 
differ, thus highlighting the importance of a conjunctural analysis, rather than attempting to 
provide a general theory of institutional creation and reproduction. 
Finally, the development of a national security state, in terms of its historicity, and 
especially mechanisms of reproduction and evolution, has important impacts on the analysis 
of present US foreign policy. The national security state has significant contemporary 
resonances that need to be better explained. For example, a historical explanation can better 
account for why change was possible in 1947 and why changes in the institutions of national 
security have been so difficult since, despite increasing concerns about militarism and civil-
military relations (e.g. Bacevich 2006). Overall, the article demonstrates the benefits of a 
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historical institutionalist reading of the postwar moment, both in terms of an approach to 
domestic institutional creation, and the enduring legacies that are revealed. 
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